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COAL SLURRY PIPELINES-IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
C.

HOWARD HARDESTY*

EDWARD S. SHIPPER, JR.**

Authors' note: On September 27, 1983, the U.S. House of Representatives
by a vote of 235 to 182 defeated H.R. 1010, bringing to an end efforts of coal
slurry pipeline supporters to obtain enabling legislation in 1983. This article,
written by proponents of granting the federal right of eminent domain for
coal pipelines, hopefully will, in a partisan, but dispassionate way, discuss the
issues involved.
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is an article of faith that energy independence is in the best interest of
this country. Our experience with OPEC's price rises and boycott in the
1970s stiffened this resolve. The question which remains, however, is
whether this goal is merely quixotic, merely another empty political
talisman, or whether it has a genuine chance for success.
Assuming that the goal is not only desirable but also realistic, this
nation's best hope for achieving energy independence lies with increased use
of its abundant coal reserves. According to a recent study by the Office of
Technology Assessment of the United States Congress, America's identified
coal deposits are sufficient to meet 100% of our current domestic energy
needs for over 500 years.' Moreover, many forecasters project substantial increases in United States coal production, from 825 million tons in 1980 to as
much as 1,486 million tons in 1995, an 800/o increase.2 Current market conditions and reasonable prudence dictate a moderation of these estimates to a
1995 production level approximating 1,200 million tons.
Congress sought to play an important role in attaining energy independence. The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Act of 19781 encouraged
greater usage of coal by prohibiting existing4 and future5 electric power
plants from continuing to use petroleum or natural gas, except under certain
* B.S., Duke University, 1943; LL.B., West Virginia University, 1949. Partner, Corcoran,
Hardesty, Whyte, Hemphill & Ligon P.C., Washington, D.C.

** B.A., Amherst College, 1974; J.D., University of Alabama, 1977. Associate, Hamel &
Park, Washington, D.C.
' OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE DIRECT USE OF
COAL (1979). See also Lowenstein, UnnaturalResource, Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1983, at 1,col. 6;
"[T]he U.S. has 237 billion tons of coal reserves-enough to last 300 years at the current rate of

consumption. The energy content of those reserves is equivalent to six times that of Saudi
Arabia's oil reserves."
2 See Alliance for Coal and Competitive Transportation[A CCT] "S. 267 and Coal Pipeline
Issues," 3 (Feb. 16, 1983) (briefing paper) (available from ACCT, 1130 17th St., N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20036) [hereinafter cited as ACCT.
3 42 U.S.C. § 8301-484 (Supp. V 1981).
§ 301, 42 U.S.C. § 8341 (Supp. V 1981).
5 § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 8311 (Supp. V 1981).
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conditions. Similarly, the ICC was admonished by Congress in the Staggers
Rail Act of 19806 to "include the encouragement and promotion of the transportation of coal by rail in accordance with the objective of energy independence."7
There are several reasons why coal is not increasing its marketing
goals-slack economy, air pollution concerns and increasing transportation
costs. Notwithstanding the national need to increase consumption of our
abundant and lowest cost energy source, coal is not being utilized as fully as
is desirable, or possible.
This article addresses the most important aspect of the nation's failure to
turn to coal and energy independence-the cost of transporting coal. The cost
is, too frequently, prohibitively high, thereby effectively negating this country's incentive to use coal.' The coal consumer is interested only in comparing the delivered costs of competing sources of energy, whatever be its
form.
II.

THE TECHNOLOGY AND THE COST

In some instances, coal transportation costs can be minimized, where, for
instance, a power plant is located at the coal mine. More frequently, however,
coal must be transported considerable distances. At present, the alternative
modes of transporting coal include barge, truck, pipeline or rail. Rail
transportation is the predominant mode.
According to a recent Energy Information Administration report,' railroads carried 554 million tons of coal in 1981, or approximately 67.7/o of the
transported coal." Moreover, railroads are frequently the only method of
transporting coal. In the Western United States, for instance, it is estimated
that 85% of the coal produced must use the rails for transportation." Thus,
"captive shippers"-those who have no existing alternative-are forced to
utilize the railroads to move their coal. The result is that more than 50% of
all coal produced has no effective competitive means by which to move to
8

Pub. L. No. 96-448, § 1, 94 Stat. 2011 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of titles 49, 46 and

title 11 U.S.C.).
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1430, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 80, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &

AD. NEws 3978, 4111.
8 Coal transportation costs often constitute 50%
prise 75%. See ACCT, supra note 2, at 3.

of the cost of the coal, and may even com-

1 ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF COAL, NUCLEAR, ELECTRIC AND ALTER.
NATE FUELS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, RAILROAD DEREGULATION: IMPACT ON COAL (1983) (avail-

able from Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office) [hereinafter cited as
ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION].

Id. at 3.
ACCT, supra note 2,at 3. See also Comment, An Analysis of Technical and Legal Issues
Raised by the Development of Coal Slurry Pipelines, 13 Hous. L. REV. 528, 530 (1976).
"
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potential customers. But an attractive, workable and in some instances less
costly alternative already exists-coal slurry pipelines.
Simply stated, coal slurry operations begin by taking coal, crushing and
grinding it into proper particle size at the slurry preparation plant and mixing it with water12 until the coal is approximately 50% of the mixture by
weight. The slurry is then pumped through a buried steel pipeline to an electric generating plant or transshipment terminal. When it arrives, the slurry
is dewatered and the water treated. Often the water can be used by the
power plant in its boilers, steam generators and in cooling operations. Additionally, technology exists on a commercial basis which permits the direct
burning of coal slurry, thus obviating much of the dewatering process.
In order to be cost effective, slurry pipelines generally must traverse a
considerable distance. In so doing they will be forced to cross railroad tracks
or property owned by railroads. Much of this property and the attendant
rights were ceded to the railroads in the mid-nineteenth century when this
country was attempting to realize its Manifest Destiny to move to the West."3
The result is that the railroads presently are in a dominant position with
respect to choosing whom or what shall be granted easements, licenses, or
the right to cross their property. And most assuredly, they have mightily and
effectively resisted any efforts would-be competitors might make at securing
such licenses, for this would force the railroads to compete for the business of
shipping coal."
Potential coal slurry pipelines have actively sought in good faith to
secure these rights of passage. However, having encountered one roadblock
after another, at both the bargaining table and in the courts, beginning
twenty years ago they turned to state legislatures and to Congress to seek
what is their only effective remaining redress-eminent domain authority.
Notwithstanding these legislative efforts, the slurry pipelines continue
for the most part to be effectively stymied. As early as 1962, President John
F. Kennedy, recognizing the railroads' antipathy to coal slurry pipelines,
Use of other liquids such as methanol, oil or liquefied carbon dioxide may also be possible.
The total amount of land granted to the railroads is approximately 145,000,000 acres, an
area as great as the combined acreage of Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana and one half of
Ohio. See generally Comment, Coal Pipelines andRailroad Crossings: Court Decisions Favor the
Pipeline Sponsors, 18 Hous. L. REV. 1075, 1081-82 (1981).
" The railroads' recent efforts to block the development of a proposed coal slurry pipeline,
which had been planned by the Energy Transportation Systems, Inc. (ETSI), are illustrative.
These ETSI plans called for construction of a coal pipeline from Wyoming's Powder River Basin to
12
"

Arkansas which would have crossed sixty-five railroad tracts, which thus required ETSI to attempt to secure easements or rights of way from the rails. When the railroads refused to grant
such rights of way, ETSI was forced to go to court to secure these rights of way. It was successful
in all sixty-five cases. See ACCT, supra note 2, at 3; See also Turn on the Coal Faucet, N.Y.
Times, June 14, 1983 at A22; Coal Slurry Spigot, Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1983, at 34.
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voiced support for federal eminent domain authority for the coal pipelines.
Specifically, he stated:
Surely a continent so rich in minerals, so blessed with water, and a society so
replete with engineers and scientists can make and must make the best possible use of the bounties which nature and God have given us, public and
private, Federal and local, cooperative and corporate. We cannot prevent
other people in this country from developing their resources. We look forward
to the day when energy will flow where it is needed. We cannot permit
railroads to prevent coal slurry pipelines from conveying the resources of our
mines."s

Similar bills were also introduced in various state legislatures at approximately the same time, which would enable slurry pipelines to use state eminent domain powers. In virtually every instance, however, the railroads have
18
successfully blocked passage of the legislation year after year. Even where
slurry pipelines have emerged the victors, such as in West Virginia, their victory has been largely a Pyrrhic one. That is, the legislation enacted by the
West Virginia legislature17 included provisions which were difficult in application."8
III.

A.

ISSUES AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

Eminent Domain

The legal issues raised in the continuing debate over coal slurry pipeline
legislation are not novel. Resolution of them is complicated, nevertheless. In
fact, these issues have provoked such an emotional response that certain parties, such as the United Mine Workers of America, have been both advocates
and opponents of coal slurry pipelines.19 The issues necessarily include legal,
philosophical and "policy" questions, and the competing interests have joined
the issue squarely at virtually every turn.
11Address by President John F. Kennedy at the dedication of the Oahe Dam in South
Dakota, Aug. 17, 1962, reprintedin Johnson and Schneider, Coal Slurry Pipelines:An Economical
and PoliticalDilemma, 48 ICC PRAC. J. 24, 30 (1980).
16Comment, An Analysis of Technical and Legal Issues Raised By the Development of Coal
Slurry Pipelines, 13 HOUS. L. REV. 528-41 (1976).
" W. VA. CODE § 54-1-2(1) (1981).
"8In West Virginia, the right of eminent domain is encumbered by requirements that the
pipeline company engage in some intrastate activity within West Virginia if there is "any reasonable demand therefor," and that the applicant for a certificate of public convenience and necessity,
a prerequisite to exercising the right of eminent domain, establish "that the patents ... shall be
...equally available ... upon fair and reasonable terms, to other bona fide applicants seeking a
certificate of public convenience and necessity" in order to prevent use of coal pipelines which
would in any way "result in any appreciable economic detriment to others." W. VA. CODs
§ 54-1-2(1) (1981).
19 Compare United Mine Workers' J. 3 (Jan. 15, 1962), with discussion infra text accompanying notes 55-57.
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1. Federal eminent domain-the need
Foremost among these issues is that of eminent domain. Under both the
1983 Senate and House bills (S. 267 and H.R. 1010), coal slurry pipelines
would have been granted federal eminent domain authority. Eminent domain
authority permits the conversion of private property to public use, for which
just compensation must be made. 0 Although that power is often reserved by
the government itself, it is now well recognized that the government can
delegate this authority to privately owned companies whose activities
enhance the public welfare.2'
For instance, in 1947, Congress amended the Natural Gas Act of 1938 to
expressly give eminent domain authority to certificated natural gas
pipelines.22 Similarly, crude oil pipelines were granted this authority during
World War II when Congress enacted the Cole Act." Licensees under the
Federal Water Power Act

4

have also been given eminent domain authority

for the purpose of construction of dams or reservoirs."
Irohically, one of the principal beneficiaries of eminent domain authority
has been the railroads themselves.26 Yet, the railroads have adamantly opposed the granting of such authority to coal pipelines, arguing that such
authority should only be granted sparingly and that coal pipelines would not
truly be in the public interest. As further support for their position, the
railroads contend that such authority is unnecessary given the coal pipelines'
legal victories in the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits.
In those cases,' the federal appellate courts affirmed a number of federal
district court rulings, deciding that a proposed slurry pipeline owned by
Energy Transportation Systems, Inc. (ETSI) had obtained valid easements
under Union Pacific Railroad's tracks for the purpose of constructing a coal
slurry pipeline.
While these results would seem, at first blush, to support the rails' contention, a close examination reveals that these cases depend entirely upon an
24 See Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878); 1
(3d ed. 1980).
21

NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN

§ 1.11

NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.23; see also J. GELIN & D. MILLER, THE FEDERAL LAW OF

EMINENT DOMAIN 18 (1982).

Pub. L. No. 80-245, 61 Stat. 459 (1947) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 717(h)).
Cole Act of July 30, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-197, §§ 1-9, 55 Stat. 610 (1947).
24 Federal Water Power Act, Pub. L. No. 66-280, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920).
16 U.S.C. § 814 (1976).
24 The right of eminent domain was granted to the railroads by state legislatures in order to
facilitate railroad construction. Comment, Coal Slurry Pipelines and Railroad Crossings: Court
Decisions Favor the Pipeline Sponsors, 18 Hous. L. REV. 1075, 1081 (1981).
Energy Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 619 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1980); Energy
Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 606 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1979).
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interpretation of a particular congressional land grant" to the railroads, which
the courts interpreted as giving the rails less than a fee simple absolute.
Given this particular rationale for the courts' decisions, it is equally clear
that a similar interpretation would not obtain with respect to rail property
east of the Mississippi River, which is generally held in fee simple. Thus, the
railroads could block the pipelines' attempts to obtain easements in other
areas. Therefore, similar litigation would be fruitless in the East, as well as
dilatory and expensive.
2.

State eminent domain-the shortcomings

It has been suggested that federal eminent domain power is not required
and that state eminent domain might be sufficient. In fact, several states
have already granted eminent domain authority to coal pipelines. 2 However,
these state statutes are few in number and are so circumscribed as to be useless to coal pipelines.
For example, in 1977 the Oklahoma Legislature enacted legislation creating the right of eminent domain for coal pipelines.2 This law also established
an elaborate licensing process for eminent domain authority under the aegis
of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission. However, this licensing process
has been used by the railroads to hinder the construction of the proposed
ETSI pipeline for several years. In addition, licensing procedural delays have
led to inflated construction costs. 1 Such obstacles are inherent in a system
which depends upon piecemeal state legislation.
When President Reagan determined that his views on federalism
precluded his support of federal eminent domain authority for coal pipelines
provided in the proposed 1981 slurry pipeline bills, he also expressed his support for the general proposition of coal slurry and promised to work for
passage of state eminent domain statutes.2 Notwithstanding this Presidential assistance, not a single additional state coal slurry eminent domain
statute has been enacted. Additionally, the experience of natural gas pipelines3 indicates there may be legal and constitutional obstacles to a state
granting such authority where the pipeline merely goes through the state in
order to serve mines and coal users in other states. 4
I Union Pacific Act of 1862, ch. 120, §§ 1-3, 12 Stat. 489-92 (1862) (as amended by Act of July
2, 1864, ch. 216, 13 Stat. 356 (1864)).
E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1723.01 (Baldwin 1979); W. VA. CODE § 54-1-2(0) (1981).
a OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, §§ 7.1-.11 (Supp. 1983).
31 See Comment, An Analysis of Technical and Legal Issues Raised by the Development of
Coal Slurry Pipelines, 13 Hous. L. REV. 528, 538 (1976).
Mr. Reagan's decision was communicated in a memorandum from the President to the
Secretary of the Interior entitled "Administration Position on Legislation on Coal Slurry Pipelines" (Nov. 16, 1981).
3 See ACCT, supra note 2, at 4.
, For example, where a pipeline simply passes through a state and does not supply coal to
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3. Full federal eminent domain-the solution
If, then, federal eminent domain is the sine qua non, it has been suggested, in the interest of federalism, that a limited federal eminent domain
option might be preferable. Such a measure was introduced in 1982 as an
amendment to H.R. 4230. It would have provided for federal eminent domain
authority for coal pipelines across "railroad rights-of-way" or "railroad properties."
In fact, however, such an accommodation would also be unworkable. Considerable legal uncertainty will be created by limiting the exercise of the eminent domain authority to "railroad rights-of-way" or "railroad property." A
review of Federal statutes reveals a variety of definitions for the terms
"railroad," "railroad property," "common carrier" and the like. 5 To be complete, any definition of "railroad property" would have to include the amorphous concept of "control," so that property held by a person controlled by a
railroad would be covered. Given the inherent uncertainties in such definitions, determinations of whether particular parcels of property are subject to
the exercise of eminent domain authority will be the subject of endless litigation. The opportunity for such litigation will hinder the development of interstate coal pipelines.
While President Reagan's desire to return to the states many of the
powers assumed by the federal government beginning in the 1930s may be
laudable, the refusal to support federal legislation for coal pipelines because
of "states' rights" is not. The legislation 3 would have granted federal eminent domain authority for interstate pipelines and the U.S. Constitution 7
specifically grants the federal government the power to regulate commerce
"among the several states." Thus, the need for full federal eminent domain
authority is paramount if coal slurry pipelines are to be built.
B.

Water Rights

1. State control under 1983 legislation
An equally important, and hotly contested issue is that of water rights.
As noted above, present technology dictates that coal slurry pipelines will
transport a mixture made up of 50% coal and 50% water, by weight. Despite
the railroads' protestations to the contrary, large volumes of water will not
utilities serving that state, the pipeline may be unable to satisfy the requisite showing of in-state

benefits.

1 E.g. 49 U.S.C. § 1(3)(a); 26 U.S.C. § 46(a)(8)(D); 45 U.S.C. § 802(7); 45 U.S.C. § 702(12) & (13).
See also ACCT, CONSTRUCTING INTERSTATE COAL PIPELINES WITH FEDERAL EMINENT DOMAIN
LIMITED TO RAILROAD PROPERTY 2 (Feb. 23, 1982) (briefing paper).
1 H.R. 1010, 98th Cong. 1st Sess., [hereinafter cited as H.R. 1010]; S. 267, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as S. 267].
' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 3.
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be required. To put this matter in perspective, a coal slurry pipeline will use
only one-fifth to one-seventh of the amount of water required for a coal fired
electric generating facility and approximately 40% of the amount of water
required by a coal gasification plant. Senator Malcolm Wallop noted that a
power plant burning the same amount of coal consumes up to seven times as
much water for cooling as a pipeline would use to transport the slurry hundreds of miles. 8
The water issue is of particular concern in the arid West where water is
at a premium and state water rights are jealously guarded. Some western
states, for instance, have enacted legislation
expressly prohibiting the use of
39
"their" water for coal slurry pipelines.
In order to allay such concerns, both the 1983 Senate and House bills contained provisions designed to guarantee and enhance state control of water
rights.4" Amendments to the 1983 Senate bill, introduced by Senator Wallop
in the proposed 1982 bill and adopted in Committee in 1983,41 would have
assured that any water used by interstate coal pipelines be acquired in compliance with state water laws.2 Moreover, the Amendment specifically prohibited the use of the bill's eminent domain authority to acquire water or the
right to water.'" The Wallop amendments also authorized states to enforce
terms and conditions on the use of water in interstate coal pipelines, even
after the water moves in interstate commerce.4 The Wallop Amendments
further assured the primacy of state water law by requiring that applicants
for federal eminent domain authority first obtain state authorization for the
water to be used in the proposed pipeline.45
Another provision of the 1983 Senate bill contained an express grant to
the states of the congressional power to regulate the terms and conditions of
permits for the use of water for a certificated coal pipeline, notwithstanding
its use in interstate commerce. 6 The bill also excluded any effect upon existing state law or regulation, or any interstate compact, "governing the appropriation, use or diversion of water."47
Thus, the 1983 legislation made every effort to insure the primacy of a
ACCT, supra note 2, at 5.
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-104 (1983).

40 See H.R. 1010, supra note 36; S. 267, supra note 36. See also ACCT, supra note 2, at 5.
"

42

See S. REP. No. 61, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). See also ACCT, supra note 2, at 5.
Section 5(a) of S. 267 and section 206(a) of H.R. 1010, supra note 36.

Section 4(e)(a) of S. 267 and section 207(b) of H.R. 1010, supra note 36.
This particular amendment was adopted by the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources which approved S. 267. See also ACCT, supra note 2, at 5.
,3 Section 5(d) of S. 267, supra note 36.
48 Section 5(b) of S. 267, supra note 36.
17 Section 5(c)(1) of S. 267, supra note 36.
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state's water rights. The Senate Committee Report further underscored
Senator Wallop's intentions.
These amendments were accepted by the Committee during its markup of the
bill and I am committed that these amendments remain as part of the bill.
Generally they insure that:
Whether a pipeline uses eminent domain or not, its use of water falls
under the laws of the State where water is sought to be acquired.
Nothing in the law can be interpreted as granting a new right for the
Federal Government or its agents to use water.
Federal reserved water cannot be used in a pipeline.
Nothing in the law will alter any state water law or interstate compact.
I offered one additional amendment to the bill which was also accepted by
the Committee. This amendment, in the nature of a finding, is a crystal clear
Congressional statement that water is to be considered unique because it is
necessary to develop the other resources within the States. In recognition of
this status, a State can place terms or conditions upon the diversion of water
which will restrict or limit the export of water for coal slurry from within the
State. This Congressional statement recognizes a State's right to do this
under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution notwithstanding any
adverse impact such a law would have on the transaction of interstate commerce.
This clear finding is dramatic evidence that Congress acknowledges the
importance of water and in view of this, Congress clearly recognizes that it is
in the public interest to vest State officials and legislatures with the power to
decide what is the best use for this critical resource. 8
2.

Commerce clause problems

These particular provisions of S. 267, and the analogous provisions of
H.R. 1010, raise an important Commerce Clause question. This issue, which is
largely a pure "legal" issue, is important because of conflicting interpretations of Sporhase v. Nebraska,49 and the effect that decision will have on the
legislative attempt to insure the primacy of state water rights. Specifically,
the legal issue might be framed as whether the express federal legislative
provisions regarding the states' control over their own water rights would effectively immunize the state water laws from Commerce Clause attacks.
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States . . ."" While the
Constitution fails to expressly provide that states may also regulate interstate commerce, it is now beyond question that state regulation of interstate
commerce will be sanctioned, within limits:
48

S. REP. No. 61, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1983).
102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
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Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefit. If a legitimate local purpose is
found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden
that will be .tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities.5 1
In Sporhase, the Supreme Court decided, inter alia, that groundwater
was an article of interstate commerce. It further ruled that a Nebraska
statute prohibiting the interstate transportation of groundwater into any
state that did not provide for reciprocal export into Nebraska was violative
of the Commerce Clause.
The Sporhase decision has prompted some to conclude that coal slurry
legislation provisions which prohibit the use of state water for coal pipelines
absent express state approval would be unavailing. Their conclusion is based
on feelings that the legislation would not effectively shield state water laws
from constitutional attack. The effect of such a ruling would, of course, be
that state water rights would have been overridden. It would render meaningless both the Wallop Amendments and the language in H.R. 1010 designed
to insure the primacy of state water rights. This view continues to be championed by a number of groups,52 including the railroads. Upon reflection,
however, it should be clear that those advocating this reading of Sporhase
have ignored or glossed over the Court's full ruling. An important part of the
Sporhase ruling was that Congress could grant to states the authority to impose otherwise impermissible burdens on interstate commerce so long as the
Congressional grant was affirmative and express: "In the instances in which
we have found such consent, [to state laws imposing otherwise unreasonable
burdens on interstate commerce] Congress' "'intent and policy' to sustain
state legislation from attack under the Commerce Clause" was " 'expressly
stated.' "I'
The constitutional infirmity in Sporhase is that while Congress had
enacted statutes generally deferring to state water rights, there was no express and explicit federal statutory provisions which would remove federal
constitutional constraints from those state laws.
When viewed in this light, it should be clear that the Wallop language of
S. 267 and the analogous provisions in H.R. 1010 constitute the required ex"' 102 S. Ct. 3463 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
'"See letter from Richard L. Trumka, President, United Mine Workers of America, to U.S.
Senators (Mar. 22, 1983).
102 S. Ct. at 3466 (citing New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 102 S. Ct. 1096, 1102
(1982), quoting Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 427. (1946)).
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press Congressional approval to insulate the state water laws from constitutional attack. Thus, the state laws' would be deemed constitutionally valid.
This reading of Sporhase and its impact on the proposed Wallop language
is further substantiated by Carol E. Dinkins, Assistant Attorney General of
the Lands and Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice. In
testimony before the Water Resources Subcommittee of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee on September 15, 1982, Ms. Dinkins
stated that the S. 1844 state water primacy language, as amended, together
with its legislative history was an effective delegation to the states of Congressional power over interstate coal slurry water transportation. This particular language of S. 1844 was also contained in S. 267.11
Ms. Dinkins also testified on April 19, 1983, before the House of Public
Works Surface Transportation Subcommittee, that the analogous language in
H.R. 1010 "appears ably to safeguard the primacy of state water laws." She
then stated: "[W]e believe that the courts will perceive and respect Congress'
considered judgment on this issue. We also believe that the proposal is prudent in offering a narrowly-drawn legislative response to Sporhase."
C. Economic Impact
1.

Transportation and labor

The issue which provokes the most visceral emotional response is
undeniably that of perceived economic effects of coal slurry pipeline legislation. Opponents of the legislation contend that passage of the bill would effectively cripple their already ailing industry. Specifically, the railroads and the
United Mine Workers aver that enactment of coal slurry pipeline legislation
will cause a massive loss of jobs, a $700 million decline in revenues, and
diminished profits and sales in the industry.5 Moreover, they assert that
these losses in the coal hauling sector will require railroads to compensate
for their losses in coal revenues by increasing rates in other sectors of their
commodity haulage business. 6
While these arguments undeniably have emotional appeal, they do not
survive critical scrutiny. First, as noted above, there is unanimity of opinion
that coal production over the next ten years will increase substantially, as
57
will the need to transport this increased production to market.
Second, even if the legislation were enacted at this time, coal slurry
" Section 5 of S. 267, supra note 36.
Letter from Richard L. Trumka, President, United Mine Workers of America, to U.S.
Senators (Mar. 22, 1983).
Id.
17 ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 9.
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pipelines would carry only a portion of that increase. It is highly unlikely that
all presently planned coal slurry pipelines could be built and in operation by
1995. Even if they were functional, however, they would carry less than half
of the projected increase in coal production during this period." Further, a
pipeline could not be engineered, permitted and constructed in less than five
years, so the railroads would not be adversely affected at all during that
hiatus. Unfortunately, with the 1983 loss in the House, these time projections
will be further delayed by years.
Third, the U.S. railroads will actually increase the amount of coal they
will haul between now and 1995. The May 6, 1983 report by the Republican
Study Committee concluded:
Since railroads carried 540 million tons of coal in 1982, railroad coal traffic will
grow at least 35% over the next twelve years. It is more likely that railroad
coal transportation will increase 44% by 1995. Competition from coal slurry
pipelines will not cost railroad jobs. Instead, it will benefit the consumer, the
coal industry, and hundreds of thousands of construction workers who would
be employed building the pipelines.
Fourth, the concern that shippers of other bulk commodities-grain and
coal for which pipeline transportation is not available-would face sharply
higher rates, deterioration of service, or both, if railroads sought to compensate revenue losses resulting from their putative diversion of coal traffic, is
also misplaced. Anyone with a passing familiarity with rail rates knows that
railroads charge every type of shipper the maximum tariff they can extract.
As corporations, railroads have a duty to their shareholders to maximize
their profits, which duty they pursue zealously. Moreover, the chorus of complaints from American agriculture and industry decrying the extortionate
rates and deterioration or elimination of rail service exists in the absence of
coal slurry transportation. Hence, the idea that construction of coal slurry
pipelines would create some new and previously unknown impetus for
railroads to charge agricultural or industrial shippers the highest possible
rates is simply unsupportable. The problems of prohibitively high rates and
quality of service exist independently of the coal slurry issue and require
redress by Congress or the ICC.
It would be inequitable to hold the coal slurry pipelines hostage to a problem they have not created and will not exacerbate until such time as Congress or the ICC addresses the problem.
Fifth, the projected "job loss" will not materialize. In fact, this legislation
should be a boon to employment. The Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor
Statistics projects that construction of seven of the proposed new coal slurry
pipelines would generate over 500,000 jobs.59 Of these, 50,000 would be in the

8

S9

ACCT, supra note 2, at 4.
Id.
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construction sector, 100,000 in the construction support sector and the remainder in the manufacturing of such items as valves, pumps, steel and
heavy equipment."
The railroads' projections of particularly drastic effects on rail employment are not convincing. If all currently proposed coal pipelines were built by
1995, which is highly unlikely, the pipelines could carry only about 25% of
the projected increase in coal production between 1980 and 1995.61 The rest of
this increased production would be carried by rail, truck and barge. Railroad
employment is projected to increase by 13,000 jobs for each 100 million ton
annual increase in coal production. Thus, by 1995 more than 40,000 new railroad jobs would be created-even with coal pipelines. 2
Lest one think that this report, issued by the Republican Study Committee, merely represents "management's" perspective on this issue, it is useful
to also examine the expressed views of the AFL-CIO which echo these
beliefs. On April 19, 1983, in testimony before the Subcommittee on Service
Transportation of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation,
Robert A. Georgine, President of the Building and Construction Trades
Department, AFL-CIO, expressed his strong support for H.R. 1010, the 1983
House of Representatives' proposed coal slurry bill. Mr. Georgine expressed
the same strong support for S. 267 in testimony before the Senate Energy
Committee on March 14, 1983.
Thus, it is clear that the railroads' stated bases for opposing this legislation are not supportable and merely constitute a guise for their actual conern: protection of their coal monopoly. In fact, as stated by Mr. Georgine,
"This legislation is pro-consumer, anti-monopoly, anti-pollution and pro-free
market."
2.

Coal exports

One additional point seems relevant for purposes of a discussion of the
economic effects of coal slurry pipelines. Specifically, coal slurry pipelines
will clearly have a salutary effect on exports of United States coal.
Many potential customers of United States coal, in
Europe and the
Pacific Rim, have minimized their purchase of otherwise attractive U.S. coal
supplies due to our high inland transportation costs. Consequently, the
domestic coal export market has suffered. Competition from coal slurry
pipelines will help reduce coal transportation costs and thereby make
American coal more competitive on the world market. The Soviets, Chinese,
and Canadians, for example, are either developing or evaluating coal
pipelines to help deliver their coal to market. These foreign proposed pipe0 Id.61Id.
2 Ird.
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lines anticipate using American-developed technology. The Soviet pipelines
may be built with U.S. technology and assistance, which may have the
unintended side of effect of assisting the Soviets in taking over foreign
customers, including Europeans, for U.S. coal. 3 The detrimental effects on
American jobs, the balance of payments and national security are selfevident.
While the railroads may not reap all the profits and jobs resulting from
the increased coal production, they will receive more than enough to remain
healthy, without a loss of existing jobs or revenues. Both railroad revenues
and employment will increase, even with coal slurry pipeline legislation.
D. Environmental Concerns
Some have opposed the legislation on an environmental basis, citing concerns regarding water, air, or hazardous waste pollution. Before getting into
the specifics of each environmental objection, the obvious should be
noted-coal slurry pipelines will be subject to all environmental laws. Failure
to comply with these laws could result in administrative, civil or criminal
sanctions, or some combination thereof.
Moreover, both the 1983 Senate and House bills contained explicit provisions designed to enhance environmental protection. S. 267 required the
Secretary of Energy to make findings on the extent to which the proposed
coal slurry pipeline would affect the environment prior to determining that
construction of a pipeline system would be in the national interest. 4 Similarly, H.R. 1010 directed the Secretary of Interior and the Interstate Commerce
Commission to consider and make findings on the extent to which the proposed pipeline would affect the environment prior to issuing a certificate to the
5
6

pipeline.

Further, both bills specified that construction of the pipeline in
designated wilderness areas should not be permitted unless no reasonable alternative exists. 66
Finally, the railroads' arguments seem both ironic and hollow when one
considers that the single operating coal slurry pipeline, the Black Mesa Pipeline, which has been an environmental success, is owned and operated by The
Southern Pacific Railroad.

Id. at 5-6.
Section 4(b)(5) of S. 267, supra note 36.
Section 208(b)(3)(D) of H.R. 1010, supra note 36.
Section 4(e)(4)(B) of S. 267 and Section 202(c) of H.R. 1010, supra note 36.
Letter from George H. Eatman, Executive Director, Slurry Transport Association, to
Senator J. James Exon, May 23, 1983.
17
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1. Clean Water Act
The need for water as the slurry medium raises not only questions about
a state's use of its own waters but also a whole host of environmental concerns. Typically, the concern involves a fear of the damage to the nation's
waters caused by disposal of the large volumes of polluted water. This fear
emanates from a misunderstanding or ignorance of the environmental protections offered by the legislation.
As noted, both S. 267 and H.R. 1010 contained express provisions
designed to guarantee that any water discharged by coal pipelines would be
environmentally clean. For instance, an amendment to S. 267, adopted by the
Committee, provided that the EPA Administrator had to review any coal
pipeline applications to determine if the water discharged from the coal
pipeline could comply with Clean Water Act 68 standards." Thus, the coal pipelines would have been required to obtain an NPDES permit pursuant to the
Clean Water Act 70 prior to discharging the waters.
The NPDES permit includes specific provisions requiring that water
discharged from a pipeline be treated pursuant to federal environmental
regulations, which requires the use of best available technology (BAT) after
July 1, 1984.71 In addition to the federal standards, pipelines would also be required to comply with any state water quality standards.7 1 Thus, the clean
water environmental concern was adequately addressed. This was not mere
speculation. Already, the ETSI project has obtained NPDES permits from
both the Oklahoma Water Resources Board and the Arkansas Department of
Pollution Control and Ecology.
2.

Hazardous wastes

A further concern involves the issue of solid and hazardous waste
disposal. This issue has arisen because an attorney for a group of protestants73 has written the Logan County Planning and Zoning Department of
Colorado and others suggesting that coal slurry constitutes a solid waste

" Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
" Section 11(a) of S.267, supra note 36 (as amended by the Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources). See also section 10 of S.267 (as amended): "Any interstate coal pipeline
distribution system authorized under this Act shall be subject to the requirements of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, and any other applicable federal environmental control
laws."
1033 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. V 1981).
71 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
72 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (Supp. V 1981).
7 The group of protestants was comprised of the Kansas City Southern Railway Company,
the Sierra Club, and the Nebraska, Iowa, and Rocky Mountain Chapters of the Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America.
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which will exhibit characteristics of hazardous wastes and as such must be
disposed of in accordance with Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act and the implementing regulations.74 The perceived concern is
unwarranted, however. Coal slurry cannot be characterized as a "hazardous
waste" under RCRA and the implementing regulations unless it is first
deemed a "solid waste.""5
RCRA regulations define a "solid waste" as "any garbage, refuse, sludge
or any other waste material which is not excluded under [40 C.F.R.]
§ 261.4(a)."7 Clearly, coal slurry is not garbage, refuse or sludge. Thus, in
order to be adjudged a "solid waste," it must be "any other waste material."
In order to be deemed "any other waste material," the key question is
whether the coal slurry would be "discarded.""7 Where, as here, however, the
slurry would be burned at the receiving utility or be exported, it could not be
deemed "discarded" and thus would not constitute a "solid waste" under
RCRA. That being the case, it necessarily follows that the coal slurry would
not be a "hazardous waste" under Subtitle C of RCRA or the implementing
regulations.
3. NEPA
Section 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act, 8 requires the
preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS) for all federal actions significantly affecting the environment. Because the slurry pipelines
would have been certificated or licensed by the federal government under
either the House or Senate bill, an EIS would also have been required.
The Bureau of Land Management of the Department of Interior has
already completed a two volume EIS for the proposed ETSI pipeline. 9 The
statement concluded that the pipeline would have no adverse impact on
vegetation or wildlife. It further outlined that the "widest range of beneficial
uses would be obtained by the use of Oahe," and that this alternative "would
not affect the use of the environment by future generations."8
4.

Clean Air Act
Because the coal pipeline would be located underground, the air pollution

", Letter from Robert N. Steinwurtzel to Logan County Planning & Zoning Department of
Colorado (Nov. 19, 1982).
42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1976).
40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a) (1983) (emphasis added).
40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c) (1983).
7' 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
Exhibit I, Testimony of Paul Doran, President ETSI Pipeline Project, before the House
Public Works Committee, Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, H.R. 1010 (Apr. 13, 1983).
80Id.
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emanating from the transporting of coal would be minimal, particularly when
compared with the fugitive dust pollution caused by railroad transportation
of the coal.
5.

Conclusion

The conclusion, therefore, that emerges from an examination of these environmental "concerns," is that those raising these questions are either
misinformed or are using such concerns as "red herrings." In fact, coal slurry
pipelines can and will be environmentally safe.
IV.

ESSENTIALITY OF COMPETITION

It is a basic tenet of economics that competition between and among competing interests is in the best interest of all because it invariably results in
greater efficiency and lower costs and prices. Moreover, competition is fundamentally fair. The obverse of this principle, of course, is that those who
need not compete in the marketplace-monopolies-will charge higher
prices.
Historically, the railroads have enjoyed, and continue to enjoy, a virtual
monopoly position with respect to transportation of coal. They are, of course,
loathe to relinquish this position. While they may pay lip service to the need
for competition, they continue to unyieldingly oppose the most promising
competitive alternative means of transporting coal-coal slurry pipelines.
Unless appropriate federal legislation is enacted securing the right of federal
eminent domain for the coal pipelines, this competitive mode will not be built,
and the rails will continue to enjoy their monopoly.
A.

Railroad Monopoly

It has already been documented that the railroads transport the lion's
share of the coal in this country. In fact, in the western states where some
85% of coal shippers are "captive" to railroad transportation," the costs of
such transportation have increased dramatically, particularly since the
passage of the Staggers Rail Act of 198082 which resulted in the deregulation
of most rail rates.8
In some cases, the costs of shipping coal constitute 75% of the delivered
cost of the coal, as is the case for the San Antonio municipal utility.' Where
rail transportation costs have become especially onerous, some in the South
"

ACCT, supra note 2, at 3.

12

Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 2011 (1980) (codified at various portions of tit. 49, 45 and 11

U.S.c.).
' See B. Johnson and S. Thomas, The Staggers Rail Act of 1980: Deregulation Gone Awry,
85 W. VA. L. REv. 725 (1983).
8 ACCT, supra note 2, at 3.
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and Southwest have chosen to import coal from South Africa, Poland and
Australia, because it is more economical to burn that imported coal than it is
to utilize domestic coal.' In some instances, these prohibitively high coal
haulage rates have even led to mine closures in the East.
Quite clearly, coal slurry pipelines would help hold down coal haulage
rates by introducing actual and potential competition into coal transportation
costs. Studies by the prestigious Electric Power Research Institute indicate
that new coal pipelines will exert downward pressure on rail rates for coal
and will permit utilities using these coal pipelines for coal transportation to
achieve significant savings in coal transportation costs. Similarly, the Consumer Federation of America and the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commission believe these coal transportation cost savings will lead to
lower utility rates than will reliance on rail cost shipments alone.
The impact of these studies is dramatically illustrated by examining a
comparison of the costs for transportation of coal per ton-mile by the respective transportation alternatives-rail, pipelines, barges and trucks. As a rule
of thumb, coal can be carried by barge at a rate of about .7 to 1.0 cents per
ton-mile; by pipeline at about 1.5 cents per ton-mile; by railroad at about 2.5
to 3.0 cents per ton-mile; and by truck at about 10.0 cents, or more, per tonmile." These variations, taken individually and in combination, illustrate the
magnitude of differences in costs for coal transportation as determined by
mode of transport.
For example, moving one unit train of coal totaling 10,000 tons for 500
miles might cost about $125,000, compared with about $75,000 for the same
shipment moved by pipeline, using the current rate levels." If the distance
for the movement were 1,000 miles, the comparable costs would be approximately $250,000 by rail, and $150,000 by pipeline. Thus, in these examples,
differences of $50,000 to $100,000 per shipment of 10,000 tons of coal, respectively, for 500 and 1,000 miles would be experienced. These distances are not
uncommon inasmuch as a typical railroad movement of coal is 450-500 miles
per trip, and movements up to 1,000 miles and larger often occur.
B. Impact of Staggers Rail Act of 1980
Congress, responding to the railroads' entreaties for assistance by way of
minimized ICC regulation, enacted the Staggers Rail Act of 1980. The Staggers Act sought to deregulate those aspects of the rail industry where competition already existed. Where, however, shippers were "captive," Congress
instructed the ICC to insure that rail rates remained "reasonable," so that
YId.
'6

National Coal Association, Coal (Feb. 18, 1983) (briefing paper).

8IId.
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the entire burden of revitalizing America's rail industry did not devolve on
a
these "captive shippers." '
Notwithstanding Congress' manifest intention to protect the precarious
position of captive shippers, the ICC has largely ignored this Congressional
directive. That is, in both individual cases and in general rulemaking proceedings, the ICC has demonstrated a one-dimensional dedication to
increased rail freight revenues, while ignoring the statutory directive to
balance the needs of shippers, carriers and the general public. In fact, the
ICC's intepretation of its duties to captive shippers under the Staggers Act
has been tantamount to de facto deregulation of railroad rates paid by captive shippers.
1. Revenue adequacy
a. Statutory definition. As part of Congress' attempt to balance the
need to protect captive shippers while furthering the goal of financial soundness for the railroad industry, Congress, through passage of the Staggers
Act, directed the ICC to make an adequate and continuing effort to "assist"
the railroads in attaining adequate revenue levels. This ICC assistance is to
be provided only for "honest, economical and efficient" carriers.89
The concept of "revenue adequacy" did not have its genesis in the Staggers Act. In fact, the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of
197611 directed the ICC to maintain standards for establishing revenue levels
for railroads that were adequate "to cover total operating expenses ... plus a
reasonable and economic profit or return (or both) on capital employed in the
business."'"
While the Staggers Act did not alter this particular statutory goal, it
created a peculiar imbalance because although it deregulated certain portions of a railroad's business, the ICC was required to continue to assist the
railroads in attaining "adequate" revenues on its overall operations, including those segments which had been deregulated.9
Despite this paradox, two things seemed clear about Congress' intention
with respect to "revenue adequacy." First, no railroad was to be given a
government guarantee of success. Second, captive shippers were not to be
forced to pay for railroad inefficiencies. Or, as the Conference Report for the
Staggers Act makes clear: the mere fact that a railroad does not yet have

49 U.S.C. § 10704(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
Id.; See also B. Johnson and S. Thomas, supra note 83.
9 Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 45 and 49 U.S.C.).
91 49 U.S.C. § 10704(a)(2). (Supp. V 1981).
B. Johnson and S. Thomas, supra note 83, at 727.
'
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adequate revenues does not, in and of itself, make an otherwise unreasonable
rate a reasonable rate. 3
b. ICC interpretation of revenue adequacy. The ICC has promulgated
several rulemakings which would explain and implement the concept of
"revenue adequacy." Perhaps the one which best illustrates the ICC's innate
bias toward the railroads, however, is Ex parte No. 347 (Sub.-No. 1), Coal
Rate Guidelines-Nationwide.4 In that February 8, 1983, rulemaking, the
ICC proposed a differential pricing scheme permitting railroads which serve
captive shippers to raise their already high captive shipper rates by 15% per
year, after inflation, until the railroad has achieved "revenue adequacy."
Utilizing this method, the Commission projected that nineteen of twenty-one
carrying railroads would achieve revenue adequacy within eight years. It
should be noted that this 15% allowance would be cumulative. An increase
could be deferred and taken in another year along with that year's allotted
15% increase. Moreover, the guaranteed 15% rise is not the maximum permissible increase. That is, where a carrier could demonstrate "compelling circumstances," the ICC, in its discretion, would permit these additional rate increases, beyond the 15%. The ICC further specified that captive coal rates
may not exceed a level equal to the "stand alone" costs that are calculated by
valuing the cost of rail plant capacity for the stand alone shipper with all
assets valued at current replacement cost. 9 In other words, before a shipper
can complain about captive rail rates, he must be able to demonstrate that
the rates exceed what it would cost him to build *arailroad for his own exclusive use.
Until a rail carrier achieves revenue adequacy, it will be free to raise its
rates unless it violates these administrative guidelines. Clearly there are no
constraints on rail rates.
Even a cursory perusal of this Commission's rulemaking strikes one as
odd because one of the central statutory directives regarding revenue adequacy-protection of captive shippers and the general public-is addressed
in only a minimal fashion. For example, the ICC failed to project the impact
of this 15% annual increase on the rates paid by shippers. According to one
estimate, shippers would shoulder a 206% increase in coal haulage rates.
Thus, a rate of $10.00 per ton in 1983 would be $30.06 per ton in 1991. Coal
shippers would pay $18 billion per year in 1991, $12 billion more than today. 7
H.R. REP. No. 1430, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 88-90, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4120-22.
:4 Ex Parte No. 347 (Sub.-No. 1) slip op. (I.C.C., Feb. 8, 1983) (served Feb. 24, 1983).
Id. at 18, n.51.
Id. at 11.
B. Shiriak, Rail Rates for Coal Transportation:An ICC Decision Costly to Shippers, 85 W.
VA. L. REv. 739, 742 (1983).
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This proposed rulemaking, which apparently guarantees a railroad's
chance for achieving revenue adequacy, seems even more strained when one
examines the financial "plight" of three railroads which are presently
deemed to be revenue inadequate:
1) CSX which originates 31.3% (165.3 million tons) of all coal, has acquired Texas Gas and Resources Company for almost $1 billion." Texas Gas
moves natural gas from the Gulf Coast and Appalachian states to the very
area where CSX gathers coal from producing mines and delivers coal to consumers. Texas Gas has extensive gas pipelines, active barge lines and
substantial oil and gas exploration and production activities.
2) The Norfolk & Southern, which originates 22% (116 million tons) of
all coal moving by rail, acquired 20.2% controlling interest in Piedmont
Airlines at a cost of $57 million in 1982."9
3) The Burlington Northern, which originates 21.1% (112.1 million tons)
of all coal, acquired the El Paso Company, a major interstate natural gas
pipeline company at a cost of $700 million in 1983.11
Surely, any description of "revenue inadequacy" which encompasses
these three examples is, at least, oxymoronic.
C.

Actual Case Studies

Even absent concrete demonstrations of the competitive benefits offered
by coal slurry pipelines, the foregoing discussion constitutes strong evidence
that federal legislation is vital. Where, as here, however, actual illustrations
showing tangible effects exist, the need for immediate positive action on coal
slurry pipeline legislation becomes compelling. Several case histories of both
the actual and potential effects of coal slurry pipelines' competition with the
railroads will serve the intended purpose.
As has been noted above, the only presently operating coal slurry
pipeline is the Black Mesa line which carries coal slurry from Arizona to Colorado. This pipeline was made possible even without coal slurry pipeline
legislation because the pipeline crossed the Santa Fe Railroad right of way at
only one point.
This is not to say that the railroad readily acquiesced in the Black Mesa
coal slurry pipeline. Rather, it agreed because a mining permit of a subsidiary or affiliate of the railroad was then pending with the Department of
Interior, which strongly favored the pipeline.' °' Thus, the railroad felt it had

's

Letter from C. Howard Hardesty to Senator Jennings Randolph (Jun. 14, 1983).

'Id.

1' Id.
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no choice in the matter. When it became clear that this particular proposed
coal slurry pipeline was a fait accompli, and that the railroad's hitherto unchallenged dominance in the coal transportation market was about to become
a relic of the past, the railroad responded by purchasing the Black Mesa
line." 2 At present, then, the Black Mesa Pipeline is owned and operated in an
examplary fashion by the Southern Pacific Pipeline Company, a subsidiary of
Southern Pacific Industries."3
A wholly intrastate coal slurry pipeline was built by Consolidation Coal
Company in Ohio in the 1950's, though that one is no longer operational. 4
Here again, when the railroads' efforts at blocking its implementation
foundered, the railroads, faced with competition, substantially reduced the
rate of transporting coal to the consuming utilities. Thereafter, the pipeline
ceased operations.
More recently, the experience with the proposed coal slurry pipeline for
Arkansas Power & Light is equally enlightening. The electric ratepayers
served by Arkansas Power & Light had been captive to the Burlington
Northern for coal haulage. Consequently, the rates they paid were high.
However, as a direct result of the competitive threat posed by the proposed ETSI coal slurry pipeline, Arkansas Power & Light was able to drive
its own bargain. Thus, it was able to realize significant savings ($16.5 billion)
which it will pass on directly to its ratepayers. 5 Despite the fact that Arkansas Power & Light actually contracted with the Chicago and Northwestern
and Union Pacific Railroads to transport their coal, rather than ETSI or Burlington Northern, the important fact is that the mere threat of genuine competition resulted in lower coal transportation costs.
Floyd W. Lewis, Chairman/President of Middle South Utilities, Inc.,
parent of Arkansas Power & Light, commented regarding the rail contract
for coal movement to its generating plants in Arkansas as follows:
I believe you assessed the situation accurately when you noted that the
presence of a proposal from a credible slurry pipeline alternative enhanced the
competitive bidding environment for this transportation. While there was additional competition between two originating rail carriers for the movement
as far as Kansas City, the pipeline alternativeprovided the only competition
to the delivering carrierfrom that point to the power plants.
As I have previously indicated, the Middle South System still supports the
slurry pipeline concept. I want to thank you again for your continuing support
Letter from George H. Eatman, Executive Director, Slurry Transport Association, to
Senator J. James Exon (May 23, 1983).
102Id.
l

10
'

See id.
Id. at 28.

Coal Slurry Spigot, Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1983, at 34.
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for the development of coal pipelines and ask that you continue your support
for the pending legislation which, hopefully, the Senate can favorably consider
this fall. In my opinion, successful enactment of this legislation into law is
necessary for consumers of electricity throughout the country to have the
benefits of competitive pricing for transportation of coal.'",
Thus, Arkansas Power & Light customers will enjoy a five percent reduction in the cost of electricity as compared to what the cost would have been if
01 7
Burlington Northern's current tariffs had not been completely challenged.
Following defeat of H.R. 1010, Secretary of Energy Donald Hodel, speaking to a tri-state citizens energy conference in Charleston, South Carolina, expressed the frustration of many when he stated:
Frankly, from my point of view, we need some kind of legislation or some.
kind of provision-I don't know whether it is coal-slurry or something
else-which will cause the railroads to begin to be realistic with the rates they
charge for transporting energy.
They have a monopolistic position and frankly they are gouging the consumers of the United States and are rendering us incapable of expanding our
markets in the international arena. Unless they come to grips with that, they
are going to be faced with increasing efforts to turn them around.1 8
V.

CONCLUSION

The case for coal slurry pipelines and the need for implementing federal
legislation is clear. The benefits to the American public are tangible, not only
in terms of increased usage of domestic coal reserves but also in terms of
lower energy costs, as well as increased coal exports.
Unlike the railroads, the coal slurry pipelines will not be dependent upon
federal largesse. While passage of this legislation does not guarantee that a
single additional coal slurry pipeline will ever be constructed, it will insure
that a genuine element of competition will have been introduced into the coal
haulage arena. That fact alone should secure its enactment. Until appropriate
federal legislation is enacted, however, slurry pipelines will continue to be
"pipe dreams."

II,

Letter from Floyd W. Lewis to Senator J. Bennett Johnston (Aug. 26, 1983).
See Coal Slurry Spigot, Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1983, at 34.

'o

See

1C

INSIDE ENERGY,

Oct. 3, 1983, at 3.
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